Elena Z. Mokhonko

Senior Researcher of the Department of Mathematical Modelling of Conflict Situations

Computing Centre
of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Vavilov str., 40, Moscow, 117967, GSP-1, Russia


Fax: (007-095)-135-61-59

Homepage contents:

  1. Common data
  2. List of Publication
  3. Information for Students. Game Theory Time (table of Lectures)
  4. Additional Information
  5. Unformal Additional Information
  6. Is it possible to compare the amount of people dying from the influence of non-optimum information influence with the amount of people dying from heavy illnesses, epidemic, etc.? (from dissertation)

Common data

Personal Data


December 7, 1952, Akhaltzikhe Georgian SSR







Academic Degrees


M.Sc., Systems of Automatic Control, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technics



Ph.D., Candidate of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, (Mathematical Cybernetics) Computing Centre of the USSR Academy of Sciences



Sc.D., Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, (Theoretical Foundation of Informatics) Computing Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Professional Experience


Engineer, Engineer-mathematician, Junior Researcher, Senior Researcher of different Research Institutes and a plant in Moscow and Moscow regions



Junior Researcher of the Computing Centre of the USSR Academy of Sciences



Senior Researcher of the Computing Centre of Russian Academy of Sciences



Associate Professor of Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Cathedra of Control and Operation Research, Faculty of Control and Economics

Research Interests

Mathematical modelling and optimization of the information processes in nonantagonistic conflicts, nonantagonistic dynamic games, investigation of the nature of information

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List of publication

  1. Mokhonko E.Z. About Differential Game with Inexact Knowledge of the Goal Function. Communications on Applied Mathematics. M.: CC of the Russian AS,1994.64 p.(Rusiian).
  2. Mokhonko E.Z. Analysis of Information Processes in Nonantagonistic Differential game // New Results of Operations Research. M.: CC of RAS, 1989. P.89-102.(Russian)
  3. Mokhonko E. Z. Control by Information Flows in Nonantagonistic Dynamic Games. Monograph.CC of the Russian AS, 1992,115p.(Russian).
  4. Mokhonko E.Z. Information and perceptive systems. Communications on Applied Mathematics.M.: CC of the Russian AS. 1992, 22 p. (Russian).
  5. Mokhonko E.Z. Mathematical Modeling is Useful under Analysis of Possibilities of Computer's Functioning Improvement. The department year's account. Part 2.4. M.: CC AS of the USSR, 1989. Initial number 11614 - 01 - 21131 from 08.12.89. Dep. N 7461 - B89 from 19.12.89. 40p.( Russian).
  6. Gusyatnikov P. B., Mokhonko E. Z. L - Infinite Evasion in Linear Differential Game of Many Players with Integral Limitations. // Prikladnaya matematika i mehanica (Applied mathematics and Mechanics). M.: V. 44, issue 4,1980, P.618-624 (Russian)
  7. Mokhonko E.Z. Perceptive systems. Communications on Applied Mathematics.M.: CC of the USSR AS, 1991. 45 p. (English)
  8. Mokhonko E. Z. Dynamic Games with Imperfect Information // ZAMM. Z. angew. Math.Mech. Akademie Verlag, Germany. 1996. V. 76, S. 3. P. 517-518. (English)
  9. Mokhonko E.Z. Nonantagonistic Differential Game with Inexact Knowledge of Goal Function//Proceeding of the 7th International Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applications. Canagava, Japan, 1996. V. 2. P. 696-704. (English)
  10. Mokhonko E.Z. The Influence of the Receiver's Properties on the Information Utility // 5th International Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applications. Geneva, Switzerland. 1992. P. 641-662. (English)
  11. Mokhonko E.Z. Time - Delayed Information in Some Nonantagonistic Differential Game // Advances in Systems, Signals, Control and Computers. South Africa.: IAAMSAD and the South African Branch of the Academy of Nonlinear Sciences.1998. V.2. P.427-431.(English)

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Time - table of Lectures


Perfect Equilibrium.



Proper Equilibrium. Persistent Equilibrium. Stable Sets of Equilibria.



Contracts and Correlated Strategies. Correlated Equilibria



Bayesian Collective - Choice Problems.



Bayesian Bargaining Problems.



The Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. A General Model of Repeated Games



Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples.



The Game Model of Funktion of the Radio Station Collective.



Differential Nonantagonistic Games



Optimal Regimes of Receptions of Information in Nonantagonistic Differential Games


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Additional Information

    I have 37 printing papers. My doctor dissertation is: Mokhonko E.Z. Dynamics of Information Processes in Nonanta-gonistic Games. CC of RAS. Dissertation ... doctor of physics and mathematical sciences. M.: CC of RAS, 1997.350 p.(Russian)

    My scientific results was reported on twenty scientific conferences. Mainly they were international conferences.

    You can ask professors Galperin E.A., Kononenko A.F., Krasovskii A.N., Nikolskii M. S., Petrosjan L.A. theirs opinion about my scientific achievements.

  1. Galperin Efim A. Professor. De'partement de mathe'matiques. Universite' du Que'bec a' Montre'al. Case postale 8888, Succursale Centre Ville Montre'al,P.Q. H3C 3P8, Canada

  2. Tel.: (514)987-3000 ext. 3229
    Fax:(514) 987-89-35
  3. Kononenko Alexandr. F. Professor. Computing Center of RUS, 40, Vavilov street, Moscow, 117967, GSP-1, Russia

  4. Tel.:(007-095) -135-62-07,
    (007-095) -168-86-53,
    Fax: (007-095)-135-61-59.
  5. Krasovskii Andrew N. Professor. Ural State University. Dept. Math. & Mech. Lenin str. 51. Ekaterinburg, 620083, Russia.

  6. Tel.:(3432) 55 75 21, Fax:(3432)55 74 01
  7. Nikolskii Mikhail S. Professor. Leading Researcher. Steklov Mathematical Institute, Gubkina 8, GSP-1, Moscow 117966, Russia

  8. Tel.: (+7)(095) 135-24-90, (+7)(095) 938-38-77,
    Fax:(+7)(095) 135-05-55.
  9. Petrosjan Leon A. Professor. Sankt - Petersburg State University, Dept. of Appllied Mathematics (PM - PU), Petrodvoretz, Bibliotechnaja Pl. 2, 198904 Sankt Petersburg, Russia.

  10. Tel.: (812) 428-42-48, (812) 428-71-59, (812) 350-50-67
    Fax: (812)218-13-46, (812) 588-80-95

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Unformal Additional Information

    My psychological type is INFJ or INTJ. I like to sing and to compose songs, jogging, to do joga gymnastics. I have coloratura soprano. I am friendly, kind and honest.

    I am in divorce. I have no children, but I hope that I shall meet nice man and shall have family.

    I like my work in Computing Centre of RAS and MIPT very much. It is very interesting work. I am happy that I work among scientists of the higher class. But I am looking for the post - doctoral course or some scientific work abroad because of the hard economic crises in Russia

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(from dissertation)

Mokhonko E.Z.

Moscow, CC of RAS

    It is natural to consider as optimal regime of reception of information such regime under which the control system carries out its function maximizing its achievement and does not destroy itself till the end of its life cycle.

    It is reasonable to conjecture that every control system has its own optimal information regime. These optimal regimes can be very different. For one system the regime of continuous reception of the exact information without delay is optimal. For other system the regime of reception of discrete, delayed information could do better. J. Forrester demonstrated in his book "Cybernetics of the manufacture" that continuous reception of the exact and undelayed information can be non-optimum regime for the system consisting of a plant, which produces some goods, of a storehouse and of a shop which sell these goods.

    Apparently implementation of computers and modern means of communications which diminishes the delay, an inaccuracy of information does not necessarily lead in all cases to the improvement of the functioning of the control system.

    In many cases such implementation needs to be accompanied by an adjustment the methods of control in order at least to keep the effectiveness of functioning of the system on the former level.

    For example, it may be necessary to ignore over some periods the incoming information or to aggregate it and then to form the control according to this aggregated information. It can be even necessary to change the structure of the control system.

    So, the alteration of information regime is the factor which destroys part of the old structures and create new substructures. This type of destructions is not desirable in many cases.

    It is necessary to estimate the danger of unsuitable, non-optimum information flow as a destructive factor.

    The simplest information system is not able to ignore the incoming information. Evidently the system can perish if the information comes more rarely than under the optimal regime. But there is also a danger related to receiving information more intensively in comparison with what is prescribed by the optimal regimes. The danger exists just because of incapability to ignore this information. The simplest perceptive system begins to react to the environment more often than it is necessary and quickly wears out itself. As a result it perishes.

    A human being consists of many simple information subsystems. Besides even man is not able to ignore the incoming information in all this cases.

    The danger of this phenomena is often underestimated. The destruction of people, social - economic and other information systems due to unsuitable information regimes is considered as natural, not forced, nonviolent death. Therefore there are no arrangements made in order to defend the systems from such destructive information influence.

    A persistent question is whether the amount of people dying from the influence of unsuitable information flows cannot be compared with the amount of people dying from heavy illnesses, epidemic, etc.?

    Let pay attention to the fact that we have to investigate the phenomenon which can be bad as for living beings as for social-economic and technical systems.

    Evidently it is necessary to create new science - the information ecology. We have to consolidate the forces of the researchers both exact sciences and the humanities, especially those researches who investigate information phenomena professionally, for example, specialists on the field of operations research.

    So we come to the conclusion that the investigation of acceptable and optimal information regimes are perspective from both theoretical and practical points of view.

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The date of modification of this home-page is 02.02.1999.

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