## On Monotonicity of a Mapping Related to the Non-Cooperative Many-Player Game

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Let  $X_i$  and  $X_i^0$  be non-empty subsets of a Euclidean space  $E_i$  with  $X_i \subset X_i^0$ , and let  $\hat{X}_i$  be direct products of  $X_j$  where  $1 \leq j \leq k, \ j \neq i$ . Next, define X = $X_i \times \widehat{X}_i$ , and let  $f_i$  be a real-valued function defined over X,  $1 \leq i \leq k$ ; finally, let  $k \geq 2$  be an integer number. We introduce a non-cooperative game  $\Gamma$  with k players by specifying, for each player i, her strategy set  $X_i$  and payoff function  $f_i$ . Denote by  $X^*_{\Gamma} \subset X$  the set of Nash equilibrium points of the game  $\Gamma$ . We say that a game  $\Gamma$  satisfies condition  $Q_1$  if X is a convex compact set, the function  $f_i$  is continuous on X and concave by  $x_i \in X_i$  for each (fixed)  $\hat{x}_i \in X_i$ . Condition  $Q_1$  guarantees that the set  $X^*_{\Gamma}$  is non-empty. Now in addition to condition  $Q_1$ , we demand that the set  $X_i^0$ be open and convex, the function  $f_i$  be defined on the set  $X_i^0 \times X_i$  and concave (for each fixed  $\hat{x}_i \in X_i$ ) with respect to  $x_i \in X_i^0$ ,  $1 \le i \le k$ . All these restrictions will be referred to as condition  $Q_2$ . When condition  $Q_2$  holds for a game  $\Gamma$  we can define a point-to-set mapping  $T_{\Gamma}$ , which associates points of X with nonempty convex compact subsets of the Euclidean space  $E = E_1 \times \cdots \times E_k$ . The mapping  $T_{\Gamma}$  is determined by the relationship  $T_{\Gamma}(x) = \{t = (t_1, \ldots, t_k): -t_i \in$  $\partial_{x_i} f_i(x), 1 \leq i \leq k$ ,  $x \in X$ , where  $\partial_{x_i} f(x)$  is the subdifferential of  $f_i$  at the point x with respect to  $x_i$ .

Any point-to-set mapping T associating points of a set  $X \subset E$  with non-empty subsets of E, generates a variational inequality problem  $t \in T(x)$ ,  $\langle t, x' - x \rangle \geq$  $0 \quad \forall x' \in X$ . Denote by  $X^*(T)$  the set of all solutions to the variational inequality problem generated by the mapping T. Taking into account that  $X_{\Gamma}^* = X^*(T_{\Gamma})$ , one can find Nash equilibrium points of the non-cooperative game  $\Gamma$  by solving the variational inequality problem induced by the mapping  $T_{\Gamma}$ .

Now assume that a mapping T satisfies the following two requirements:

(A) the sets X and T(x) for any  $x \in X$  are convex and compact, the mapping T is upper semi-continuous on X;

(B) the mapping T is monotone.

In [1], we describe a quite efficient numerical method

solving variational inequality problems, which is based upon an extension of the well-known method of levels. Under assumptions A and B, we also establishe that a sequence of points generated by this algorithm converges to the set  $X^*(T)$ . Now if requirement  $Q_2$  holds for a game  $\Gamma$ , then mapping  $T_{\Gamma}$  satisfies condition A.

Consider a finite non-cooperative k-person game, in which each player *i* has  $n_i$  strategies, and her payoff function is determined by a k-dimesional table  $A_i = (a_{s_1...s_k}^{(i)})$ , where  $a_{s_1...s_k}^{(i)}$  is the *i*-th player's payoff when player  $\alpha$  chooses strategy  $s_{\alpha}$ ,  $1 \leq \alpha \leq k$ . If we extend the strategy set and introduce mixed strategies, we come to a k-person game  $\Gamma$ , in which

$$X_{i} = \left\{ x_{i} = (x_{i1}, \dots, x_{in_{i}}) : \\ \sum_{j=1}^{n_{i}} x_{ij} = 1, \quad x_{ij} \ge 0, \ 0 \le j \le n_{i} \right\}, \quad (1)$$
$$f_{i}(x) = \sum_{s_{1},\dots,s_{k}} a_{s_{1}\dots s_{k}}^{(i)} x_{1s_{1}} \cdots x_{ks_{k}}, \ 1 \le i \le k,$$

where  $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_k) \in X$ .

**Theorem 1** Let  $\Gamma$  be a game determined by relationships (1). The mapping  $T_{\Gamma}$  is monotone if, and only if it is possible to represent the tables  $A_i$  as follows:  $A_i = \sum_{j=1}^k A_{ij}, 1 \leq i \leq k$ , where entries of a kdimesional table  $A_{ij}$  depend only upon indices  $s_i$  and  $s_j$  when  $i \neq j$ , and do not depend on the index  $s_i$  whenever i = j. Besides, for any  $i \neq j$ , all entries of tables  $A_{ij} + A_{ji}$  must equal zero.

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## References

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