1-st Moscow international conference on Operations Research. Pappers of Russian Scientific Operations Research Sociaty (RSORS)

Edited by Malashenko Y.E., Novikova N.M.

(Moscow, 10-13 April 1996)


E.V. Avtukhovich. The Existence of the Solution of the Complementary Problem for Set--Valued Mappings. 103
G.A. Belyankin, I.A. Medvedkov, V.V. Morozov. Games Theory Statement of the Statistical Recognition Problem and It's Solution for Series of Classification Rules. 103
M.R. Davidson. Potential Reduction Method for a Two-Stage Stochastic Programming Problem. 107
V.V. Fedorov, N.S. Vasiliev. Aggregation in Networks. 110
M.G. Fourougian. Algorithms of Calculation Planning in Real--Time--Systems. 111
S. Guriev and M. Shakhova. Self-organization of Trade Networks in an Economy with Imperfect Infrastructure. 112
N. Katushkina. Simulation Model of the Metro Network. 127
Mikhail Kreines. Mathematical Models of Decision Making Support in Medicine. 128
Alexander V. Lotov. Generalized Reachable Sets Method: 25 Years of Experience. 132
Y.E. Malashenko, N.M. Novikova, O.A. Vorobeichikova./newline A Game Г$_1$ with Vector-Function of Pay-Off. /hfill 139 139
M.S. Nedjak. Turnpike Theorem for a Model of Consumption of Nondurable and Durable Goods. 145
N. Obrossova. The Analysis of Equilibrium Price Stability in the Price Formation Model of Valras Type with Delays. 151
J.N. Pavlovskii. L.N. Tolstoi's Factor in Armed Struggle. 157
Alexey B. Petrovsky. Approaches to Structurize Qualitative Alternatives. 157
N.M. Popov. Methods for Approximate Building of Pareto-Optimal Point Set in Continuous Malticriterial Problems. 158
Mihael A. Potapov, Grigory V. Kosenok. Kantorovich Diagram Application for Function Representation in Operation Recearch Methods. 159
I.A. Samoilova. Nash Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies in Bertrand Duopoly Market. 160
S.V. Somov. Some Estimates of the Auction Outcome Deviation from the Walrasian Equilibrium. 163
A.A. Vasin. On some problems of Evolutionary Game Theory. 167
A.A. Vasin, N.N. Evtikhiev. The Mathematical Models of the Optimal Bid for the Primary Government Bond Auction. 170